The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), established in 1975, provides evidence-based policy solutions to sustainably end hunger and malnutrition and reduce poverty. The Institute conducts research, communicates results, optimizes partnerships, and builds capacity to ensure sustainable food production, promote healthy food systems, improve markets and trade, transform agriculture, build resilience, and strengthen institutions and governance. Gender is considered in all of the Institute's work. IFPRI collaborates with partners around the world, including development implementers, public institutions, the private sector, and farmers' organizations, to ensure that local, national, regional, and global food policies are based on evidence. IFPRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium.
INTRODUCTION
Social interactions are known to exert a strong influence on individuals' labor market outcomes, mainly through the sharing of information about vacancies and through direct referrals (Granovetter 1995; Ioannides and Loury 2004) . Researchers have collected a large body of descriptive and econometric evidence on these mechanisms (Topa 2011) . In Ethiopia, referral hirings are common (Mano et al. 2010) , and the use of social networks in job searches is widespread and has a positive impact on the exit rate from unemployment (Serneels 2007) . The data we collected in a middle-size urban town in northern Ethiopia confirm the importance of social interactions: 41 percent of employed individuals heard of their current occupations through their social contacts, and 29 percent received explicit referrals. Exclusion from job contact networks is likely to constitute a major disadvantage for labor market participants (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004) . Understanding how individuals form job contact networks hence becomes a prerequisite to formulate effective policies to reduce economic exclusion in labor markets.
This paper investigates whether individuals would be willing to connect to peripheral peers when competition for scarce referrals makes it in their interest to do so and when self-regarding concerns are removed. Empirical analyses of social networks typically reveal an unequal distribution of links across individuals (Jackson 2008) . The job contact networks we observe in our study are no exception.
1 Indeed the distribution of links in local networks resembles the power distribution generated by models of preferential attachment. In these models, individuals are more likely to link with currently central peers, and initial advantages reinforce over time.
2 Yet if networks are formed strategically, peripheral individuals would be integrated in job contact networks whenever peers have the right incentives to do so. Calvo-Armengol (2004) proposes a model wherein competition for referrals makes links to peripheral partners valuable. In such an environment, asymmetric network architectures cannot be sustained in equilibrium (Calvo-Armengol 2004; Calvo-Armengol and Zenou 2005) . These predictions are reinforced if individuals choose links also on the basis of two widespread other-regarding preferences: social welfare maximization and inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Charness and Rabin 2002) .
We hypothesize that individuals understand and respond to the incentives created by the topology of the network and hence that they will link to peripheral peers when this maximizes their chances of referral. We further hypothesize that individuals care about the effects of network structure on peer welfare. When self-regarding concerns are removed, individuals will still choose to connect to peripheral peers if this maximizes social welfare and outcome equality. We devise an experimental design adapted from Beaman and Magruder (2012) to test these hypotheses. A common problem in analyses of network formation is that network variables may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of individuals. Our question is thus best tackled in an experimental setting where initial networks can be imposed exogenously. Furthermore, in analyses of observational data it may be hard to disentangle the different layers of social interaction. Conditions created in the lab enable us to focus the analysis on job referral networks alone. In the lab we also have control over incentives, which we can make clear and salient. This enables us to "give the best shot" to the model of incentive-sensitive network formation and hence develop a credible first test. Last, we strengthen the external validity of the experimental design by 1 See Appendix Figures B.1 and B.2. In these figures, we present information about the job contact networks of the respondents. A job contact link between individual i and individual j is said to exist if i has reported giving to j or receiving from j information about job vacancies or a job referral. In Figure B .1 we depict the thus defined links of one of the block-level social networks in our sample. Blue squares represent individuals. Lines represent the job contact links. The isolated squares on the left of the picture represent the individuals with no block-level job contact links. We define the number of job contact links an individual has as his or her network degree. In Figure B .2 we plot the distribution of the network degree of the respondents. The modal degree is zero, but a number of individuals have relatively large networks. More information about the data used to produce these figures is given in Section 4.
2 For models of preferential attachment see Jackson (2008) . Central individuals may be better placed to collect information about vacancies. Furthermore, theoretical models stress that central individuals are more valuable partners in risk-sharing arrangements (Bramoulle and Kranton 2007) and can be trusted more because of higher social collateral (Karlan et al. 2009). introducing field context in the subject pool and in the task to be carried out. Following the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004) our study can be defined as an artefactual field experiment.
We run our experiment with young adult dwellers of randomly sampled blocks in a small town in Ethiopia characterized by an expanding formal sector and the extensive use of job contact networks. Some of the participants in each lab session are randomly drawn to carry out a small remunerated task in the lab and to subsequently make a referral for the same task. Participants are assigned positions in a predetermined, undirected, irregular friendship network, and if given the job, one of their ties is selected at random to receive the referral. Before the game is played, individuals are informed of the whole structure of the network and have the opportunity to indicate two further agents with whom they would like to be linked. Our analysis focuses on this link-formation decision. The linking preferences of a single, randomly drawn, unemployed participant are activated unilaterally. This network-formation rule switches off other-regarding concerns, as participants' choices have no effect on the outcomes of their peers. Additional treatments relax anonymity and switch other-regarding concerns back on by implementing the linking preferences of a single employed participant.
We find broad support for strategic network formation. First, in treatments wherein otherregarding concerns are absent, agents are more likely to form new ties with peripheral peers, both when players' identities are known and when they are not. Our results are stronger when we focus the analysis on individuals who have performed well in an initial understanding test. Results from an additional treatment rule out priming effects due to the understanding test and the extensive explanation of incentives. Second, in treatments where other-regarding considerations are made salient, we are unable to find evidence for our hypothesis. The answers to a postplay questionnaire suggest that many participants chose their links according to a norm of horizontal equality that did not reflect different endowments of network connections. Finally, in non-anonymous treatments, agents link with peers whom they know in real life, even when this brings no additional material benefit to either party.
Overall, subjects seem able to understand the incentives that arise from the topology of the network and the referral process and are willing to adjust their linking decisions to maximize their chances of getting a referral. This central finding can be the basis for the design of hiring policies that strengthen the position of peripheral individuals in job contact networks.
This study is related to the empirical literature on social interactions in the labor market. This literature has deployed different empirical strategies to document significant peer effects in labor market outcomes in both developed and developing economies (Topa 2001; Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008; Magruder 2010; Cingano and Rosolia 2012) , has identified important nonlinearities in these effects (Beaman 2012) , and has highlighted how referees respond to pecuniary incentives and may sometimes act opportunistically (Fernandez and Castillas 2001; Fafchamps and Moradi 2009; Beaman and Magruder 2012) and how specific groups can be discriminated against in the referral process (Beaman, Keleher, and Magruder 2013) .
Our work also relates to the literature on network formation, which so far has presented some experimental evidence for strategic link formation (Callander and Plott 2005; Conte, Cagno, and Sciubba 2009) and has reflected on the role of inequality aversion (Goeree, Riedl, and Ule 2009; Falk and Kosfeld 2012) but also has presented evidence consistent with a distaste for equality (Van Dolder and Buskens 2009) .
Results from treatments in which other-regarding considerations are made salient will be of interest for scholars studying the experimental evidence on other-regarding preferences and norms in Africa south of the Sahara (SSA) (Barr and Stein 2008; Jakiela 2011; Miller Moya et al. 2011; Voors et al. 2011; Mueller 2012) .
Our work contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we provide the first test of the behavioral assumptions in the influential model of Calvo-Armengol (2004) . Calvo-Armengol's insight about the endogenous nature of social interactions in the labor market has been influential for the subsequent literature (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004; Wahba and Zenou 2005; Galeotti and Merlino 2010; Schmutte 2012) and can prove very valuable in the design of policies to tackle economic exclusion. We show that the assumption of strategic network formation in the labor market passes a first, internally valid test. Second, our results further suggest that models of other-regarding preferences with high predictive power in simple allocation decisions can perform poorly in different domains-in our case, a link-formation task. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Voors et al. (2011) and should motivate researchers to pay more attention to social norms that arise in specific domains. On the methodology side, we address typical endogeneity concerns that arise in dyadic settings through random link assignment. Furthermore, our design excludes nonequilibrium reasoning (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri 2013) , which may have shaped play in the repeated link-formation games previously attempted in the literature and hence produces clean evidence on self-and other-regarding motives in experimental link formation.
The next section presents the experimental design. Section 3 puts forward a number of predictions from a model of network formation with self-and other-regarding concerns. Section 4 presents the data, and Section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes.
DESIGN
In the experiment, each subject is assigned to an exogenous lab network and specifies two additional peers to whom he or she would like to be linked. After subjects express their preferences, lab jobs are assigned through a lottery. Each job holder has to perform a task in the lab, for which he or she will be remunerated. Furthermore, each job holder has to refer one unemployed contact in the lab network for the job. If a job holder has more than one unemployed peer, the referral is given to one of the eligible peers chosen at random. The network thus determines who can refer whom for a lab job.
In each lab session nine subjects play the game. Participants typically reside in the same neighborhood, often on the same block. Information about individuals' real-life connections is also exploited in the analysis.
The game proceeds as follows. First, each subject draws an ID letter from an urn. This letter remains private throughout the game. Second, each subject plays a standard dictator game with an anonymous opponent in the room. Third, instructions for the second part of the game are given, and subjects' positions in a network of undirected links, which are represented in Figure 2 .1, are revealed to them. Nodes are identified with letters, and network ties are called "lab-friends." Subjects' understandings of the network structure and the incentives of the game are tested by means of a simple questionnaire. If more than one participant makes more than one mistake, the lab assistant is instructed to go through the explanation one more time. After understanding has been ensured, all subjects are asked to specify two additional agents to whom they would like to link.
3 Our analysis focuses on these linking decisions. Jobs are then drawn by the lab assistant. The network is updated according to a rule that varies with treatment. Referrals are assigned according to the updated network. While the lab assistant performs these tasks, participants are invited to respond to a short questionnaire on the motivations behind their choices in the experiment. At the end of the game, job holders are asked to perform the lab task and can then collect their winnings. These will include a show-up fee, allocations from the dictator game, and the wage for the lab job. 4 Participants who got referred for a lab job collect the show-up fee and the dictator game allocation and are then invited to come back the next day to perform the lab job and be paid for it. Finally, participants who got neither a job nor a referral collect their winnings and leave. All payments are given privately to the participants.
Treatments vary the network-updating rule to identify different motives behind linking choices. In a first set of treatments, which we call SELF treatments, we update the network with the links specified by a single, randomly drawn, unemployed player. This rule achieves two things. First, the linking decisions are implemented only when the player did not get a job. This minimizes other-regarding considerations: The additional links do not affect to whom the agent can give a referral.
5 Second, implementing the linking preference of a single player removes strategic thinking (Crawford, CostaGomes, and Iriberri 2013) . Subjects do not have to speculate about what others will do: If one's choice is implemented, it will be the only modification to the existing network. In a second set of treatments, the OTHER treatments, we update the network with the links of a single, randomly drawn employed player. Linking decisions determine who will get the player's referrals and cannot be used to maximize the chance of getting a referral for oneself. Hence other-regarding motives become salient, whereas self-regarding considerations are switched off.
The SELF and OTHER treatments are played both with anonymous identities (SELFa, OTHERa) and with identities that are common knowledge (SELFn, OTHERn). In the latter, players are first asked to communicate their names in front of the group. Names are then written next to the respective nodes in the network, and each participant is given a copy of this network map. Non-anonymous treatments give a more arduous test to the hypothesis that individuals prefer to link with peripheral peers. Although centrality is clearly salient in the anonymous treatments, agents may focus on a number of other peer characteristics in the non-anonymous case.
7 Notice, however, that decisions remain private: At the end of the game agents are told whether they received a referral but are not informed about whether the network has been updated with their decisions. This makes it hard for agents to require side payments from each other after the experiment has been played.
In the standard protocol subjects are reminded of the incentives that arise from the structure of the game.
8 Before asking for their linking decisions, players' understanding of the network map and of the incentives is tested with five questions. If more than one participant makes more than one mistake, the lab assistant is instructed to go through the explanation one more time. Such explanations and tests are important to ensure participants understand the consequences of the decisions they are making. However, we worry that if participants have a desire to please the experimenter (Levitt and List 2007; Zizzo 2010) , they may be primed by our questions to behave in the way they think we want them to behave. Our last treatment (SELFa2) is thus devised to reduce priming effects. In SELFa2, we give participants the same explanation of the rules of the game but omit any discussion of the incentives that these rules produce. Furthermore, we postpone the test of understanding until after the players have made their linking decisions.
9 In this way we reduce both cognitive and social-related priming (Zizzo 2010) . Table 2 .1 summarizes the treatments and their characteristics. Subjects are presented the network structure through a network map, which is reproduced in Figure 2 .1. Recent research in network cognition has uncovered a projection bias that is relevant to the present investigation: Subjects overestimate the degree of agents characterized by a degree lower than themselves (Dessi, Gallo, and Goyal 2012) . If that is the case among our experimental subjects, the role of centrality may become less salient simply because high-degree subjects underestimate the low degree of others. We take steps to limit this problem. First, the simple network structure in our design mitigates this concern. Second, the degree of each node is specified next to the ID letter. Third, the first three preplay questions test whether subjects could infer network centrality from the map. Incorrect responses to these questions are extremely infrequent.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects play a standard dictator game (Camerer 2003) . A player splits ETB 20 with an anonymous partner in the same session. Each subject is assigned to two pairs: He or she plays the sender in the first pair case and the receiver in the second pair. Each player is aware that he or she is not playing twice with the same partner. Allocation decisions are private. Subjects are informed of the amount they have received only at the end of the lab session.
Dictator games offer a simple way to measure social preferences (Camerer 2003) . These are typically categorized as four standard groups (Charness and Rabin 2002): selfish, competitive, inequality averse, and social welfare maximizing. Selfish individuals care only about maximizing their own payoff. Competitive individuals maximize the difference between their payoff and that of the receivers. Inequality-averse individuals minimize payoff differences between themselves and the other players. An inequality-averse person hence gives to others only when he or she starts with a better endowment. Finally, social welfare maximizers care positively about the receivers' payoffs regardless of the relative size of initial allocations.
In our experiment the dictator is endowed with ETB 20, whereas the receiver has no initial endowment. The amount given in this game hence reflects the strength of the sender's concern for the receiver's payoff when the initial allocation favors the sender. Giving in the dictator game is hence consistent with a preference for social welfare maximization and with inequity aversion. For the purposes of our experiment, we do not need to distinguish between these two types of preferences, as they would motivate identical behavior in the link-formation game. 10 We hence consider giving in the dictator game a simple measure of pro-social social preferences.
To ensure comparability and minimize noise factors during play, we follow a number of established practices in the lab-in-the-field literature. These include extensive piloting, simple standardized instructions that are read out to participants, double translation of all written material, and reliance on physical randomization devices (Barr and Genicot 2008; Viceisza 2012) .
The Network
Each of the nine participants in a session is assigned a position in the network presented in Figure 2 .1. In the network, there are three degree 1 agents, three degree 2 agents, and three degree 3 agents. No agent has links with all agents of a given degree. Hence, when considering which additional links to establish, each agent in the network has at least one option for each centrality category.
HYPOTHESES
We now discuss in more detail the main hypotheses that will be tested. Our first hypothesis is inspired by the model of Calvo-Armengol (2004) , whose strategic environment is reproduced in our game. Let ( ) be i's chance of being employed given network g, ∈ (0,1) be the likelihood of being initially selected to perform the lab job, and ( ) be i's chance of being referred into the job by at least one peer in network g. Furthermore, let ( ) be the set of direct contacts of i in g and ( ) be the number of contacts. ( ) represents the set of missing direct links, and g+ik is the original network augmented by link ik. The strategic network-formation model posits that individuals will choose link ik so as to maximize their chances of getting lab jobs. Formally, participants solve the following problem:
( + ) can be expressed as the complement of the probability of receiving no referrals:
Conditional on k's being employed, ( ( )) gives the probability that k will refer i out of his ( ) friends. This probability can be expressed as follows:
After some algebra, equation (4) follows from (3).
11 When k is employed, the probability he or she will refer i boils down to the probability that i will be picked out of the average number of unemployed neighbors of k-
-conditional on at least one person being unemployed-1 − ( ) . It is easy to show algebraically that (4) decreases in ( ) : 12 Proposition 1.
The result is intuitive: Two links away partners are competitors for rival referrals opportunities. A partner with higher degree centrality is hence less likely to provide i with a referral. A subject who is solving problem (1) will thus prefer to link with the least central individual in . Furthermore, in our game gains from following the optimal strategy are nontrivial. Conditional on being unemployed, a degree 1 agent who establishes two links with two other degree 1 players has a 72 percent probability of being drawn for a referral. This probability drops to 58 percent if he or she chooses to link with two degree 3 agents. This is a substantial 14 percentage points difference. 13 We thus formulate our first hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. Subjects in treatment SELFa and SELFn will target their new links to degree 1 peers.
11 See appendix for all proofs. 12 This result is essentially the first part of remark 1 in Calvo-Armengol (2004) . 13 Subjects in SELFa and SELF treatments are informed of these probabilities. Subjects in SELFa2 are not.
Notice that this hypothesis is not consistent with models wherein network formation does not respond to extrinsic incentives. If subjects follow the simple heuristic of preferential attachment, for example, they will keep referring high-degree subjects even if it is not in their material interest to do so.
Let us now turn to OTHER treatments. Now new links affect the employment chances of others and do not affect the employment chances of ego. In our setting, the chances of employment increase monotonically with the number of direct links. Degree 1 agents are hence those who have the smallest chance of employment. Furthermore, the marginal benefit of a new link is decreasing in the number of existing links. Degree 1 agents are hence also those who stand to gain the most from an additional link. More formally, 14 Proposition 2. 15 Players who are social welfare maximizers and inequality averse would send money in a dictator game that starts with unequal endowments.
For illustration, let us assume other-regarding preferences of the following form:
γ is the altruism parameter. Any ik link will increase i's and k's welfare and decrease the welfare of the ( ) current contacts of i, who are now facing one more competitor for i's referral. We can hence decompose the effect of the linking decision on i's utility in three elements:
The first element, reflecting the payoff of i in the game, is not affected by which particular k is chosen. The third element reflects the negative externality on i's current links. Such externality is present no matter to whom i decides to link and does not depend on ( ).
17 The second term is what motivates the agent to link with the less central individuals. Proposition 2 shows that the marginal payoff k gets from a link with i decreases in k's degree. Choosing the least central k means establishing the link with the agent that will benefit from the connection the most. This maximizes the value of the second term in equation (6). Hence we hypothesize that subjects in the OTHER treatment will be more likely to link with their peripheral peers.
18
14 The second part of remark 2 in Calvo-Armengol (2004) makes a point similar to the first part of proposition 2 here. 15 Inequality-averse agents feel envy toward those with higher payoffs and guilt toward those with lower payoffs. Social welfare maximizers care positively about the welfare of other persons, without conditioning on relative payoffs. Competitive agents maximize the difference between self and the other players. Selfish agents maximize their own payoffs. 16 These are akin to the social welfare maximizing type. 17 Notice that if the player specifies no link, two links are assigned to him or her anyway. Also notice that unemployed agents can receive multiple referrals, in which case one of the referrals is simply lost. This ensures that the degree of k has no influence on the size of the negative effect on the current contacts of i.
18 A similar argument can be made for inequality-averse agents. With inequality aversion, however, there is an ambiguity for the behavior of degree 1 players, who may fear becoming envious of their degree 1 peers if they link with them. The empirical analysis reveals degree 1 players behave no differently in the game, and we hence explore this point no further.
There is an additional reason that agents may want to include peripheral peers. Several questionnaire studies in empirical social choice have reported that other-regarding agents attach special weight to the well-being of the least well-off (Yaari and Bar-Hillel 1984; Gaertner and Schokkaert 2011) . These considerations would strengthen the desire to link with degree 1 individuals.
Hypothesis 2. Subjects in treatment OTHERa and OTHERn treatments will create new links with degree 1 peers.
This effect is driven by pro-social, other-regarding individuals. Hence we expect a positive correlation between giving in the dictator game, which is meant to capture such preferences, and the choice to link with a degree 1 peer. Notice that although giving in the dictator game is costly, the choice to include a peripheral peer does not involve any material sacrifice. This minimizes concerns about wealth effects' generating a spurious negative correlation between the two games (Andreoni and Miller 2002) .
Hypothesis 3. The higher the amount sent in the dictator game, the more likely subjects in the OTHERa and OTHERn treatments will be to link with degree 1 peers. Dictator game giving is uncorrelated with play in SELF treatments.
The game is played by subjects who come from the same neighborhoods and, in many instances, from the same block. Theories of directed altruism predict that individuals in the OTHERn treatment act more altruistically toward acquaintances (Goeree et al. 2010; Leider et al. 2009; Ligon and Schechter 2012) . We expect this effect to be at work in the OTHERn treatment, where agents are aware of the identities of those who receive the referral. We do not expect, however, directed altruism to play a role in the choices under the SELFn treatment, where links to a friend do not produce any material benefit for the friend and are sometimes detrimental to one's own material benefit.
19
Hypothesis 4. Subjects in the OTHERn treatment will be ceteris paribus more likely to refer those whom they know in real life. Decisions of subjects in the SELFn treatments will not be affected by such knowledge.
We will analyze the data using dyadic regression analysis. In particular, we will test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 using models of the following form: = + 1 2 + 2 3 +
The unit of observation is all initially unlinked, directed dyads.
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is a dummy that takes value 1 if i has chosen to establish a new link with j.
is another dummy variable indicating individuals with experimental degree centrality x. Model 7 will be estimated using ordinary least squares, correcting standard errors for arbitrary correlation at the session level. 21 The coefficients on will provide the basic test for hypotheses 1 and 2. If 1 and 2 are significant and negative we will have evidence that in our experimental social network, agents value peripheral partners more than central ones.
We run separate analyses for the data from the SELF and OTHER treatments, as these elicit different decision mechanisms. We investigate the effects of subtreatments and of i's characteristics such as understanding or giving in the dictator game by means of simple dummies interacted with j's degree:
19 This is the case when the friend is degree 2 or 3. 20 This means that the matrix is not the full n(n-1) square matrix. We call the dyads directed because they express directed willingness to link. Notice that the actual dyads in the network are undirected 21 In future work we are planning to implement the wild bootstrap correction to standard errors, which will ensure low cluster sizes are not leading to over-rejection of the null in our significance tests. Analysis of the SELF treatments will not likely be affected by this correction, as we rely on 30 clusters, which is considered by some authors the low bound of acceptable cluster numbers. Estimates from OTHER treatments will be more affected as these are based on clustering on 20 clusters. However, we fail to find significant results even before the bootstrap correction. None of the results of this paper will hence be affected by bootstrapping.
DATA
The fieldwork for this project took place between September and October 2012 in the city of Kombolcha, on the main road between the capital, Addis Ababa, and Mekelle, in the South Wollo province of the Amhara region. According to the 2007 census, the city has a population of about 59,000. In recent years, Kombolcha has benefited from a number of industrial developments. The city can now count on an expanded textile factory, a metalwork factory, a large brewery, and smaller firms working on the processing of leather and seeds. This expansion of the formal sector makes Kombolcha an ideal place to study job referral networks in Ethiopia. As constraints on the number of available jobs are progressively relaxed, it is important to investigate whether some individuals and groups are excluded from the allocation of the new economic opportunities. Background qualitative fieldwork at the onset of the project and descriptives from the survey data reveal that reliance on job contact networks in Kombolcha is indeed extensive.
Our sampling strategy was based on the following steps. First, based on qualitative fieldwork and discussions with local officials, we identified three low-to middle-income, urban, residential neighborhoods. 22 We delineated all residential blocks of houses in each neighborhood using the Google Earth map of the city and randomly sampled 19 blocks. On each block, we listed all individuals in the age group 20 to 40 who were resident on the block and in town at the time of our fieldwork. We invited all sampled individuals to take part in the experiment. Of 518 individuals who were interviewed, 447 took part in the experiment. 23 The sampling strategy enables us to capture block-level networks. We have reason to believe this is a focal domain of interaction. There is substantial support for this assumption in the empirical literature. 24 Furthermore, in our sample, we measure an exchange of information or referrals for a nontrivial 21 percent of dyads. 25 Network information was collected in the following way. Individuals were presented with a list of all people in the 20 to 40 age group residing on the block and were asked to identify those people they knew. This corresponds to the star-induced network defined by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) . 26 For each link, respondents were asked questions regarding the strength of the link and various dimensions of social interaction: asking, giving, and receiving job information; giving and receiving referrals; borrowing and lending; and gift exchanges. Subjects who knew each other had spoken on average on 12 days of the previous month. In about 65 percent of cases i defined j as a "worship place acquaintance," in 12 percent of cases as a member of the same family, and in 14 percent of cases as a close friend. Figures B.3 and B.4 present this descriptive data.
The survey also included standard sociodemographics such as household characteristics, age, gender, ethnicity, education, and migration status. A detailed module on labor market experience was 22 We excluded the other three neighborhoods either because they included rural agglomerates or because they had few dwellers.
23 Appendix TableB.1 shows that there are few statistically significant differences in observable characteristics between individuals who took part in the experiment and individuals who did not. Selected individuals are less likely to be Muslim and tend to report a higher number of links in the neighborhood. When we replace i's self-reported links with the number of peers who have mentioned i as a friend, the selection effect on the network variable disappears.
24 Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) , for example, show that geographical proximity is an important determinant of friendship among U.S. adolescents. Their empirical strategy is particularly credible as it relies on random assignment to dorms. In a developing country setting, Karlan et al. (2009) report that 59 percent of observed dyadic ties among Peruvian shantytown dwellers are between neighbors, whereas Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) document that geographic proximity is a strong predictor of risk-sharing behavior. Looking more specifically at labor market settings, Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008) analyze census data on the Boston metropolitan population and find a strong, significant effect of shared block residence on the probability of working in the same census tract. Similarly, Hedstrom, Kolm, and Aberg (2003) document peer effects in the duration of unemployment among Stockholm youth. Their proxy of peer group is also given by small geographical units where a median number of 66 young people reside. Finally, Topa (2001) shows that unemployment patterns in Chicago's neighborhoods are consistent with a peer effect model, albeit he focuses the analysis on geographical areas far larger than blocks. 25 Overall, our empirical dataset consists of 15,588 block-level dyads among 518 individuals on 19 blocks. In 1,804 cases i knows j, and in 377 cases i has given to or has received from j job information or a referral. 26 We included in the list individuals who reside on the block but who were not available for interview (in most cases, they were out of town) at the time of fieldwork. administered, capturing employment status, job characteristics, search strategies (searches while unemployed and while on the job), and referrals. A further module investigated expectations regarding employment, wage, and unemployment exit rates.
We report in We check for covariates balance for both levels of randomization. Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 show the result of our tests employing simple ordinary least squares regressions. Each column corresponds to a regression of a different dependent variable on dummies for individual and session treatments. The column heading specifies the dependent variable that is being tested. Table B .2 confirms that the observable characteristics of participants assigned to different levels of network centrality are not statistically different. Table B .3 shows that there are some weak differences across individuals in the SELF and OTHER treatments: Individuals in the SELF treatments are more likely to be male, older, and less central in their real-world networks. These effects are not large and are significant at only the 10 percent level; however, they motivate caution when comparing the magnitudes of effects across treatments. In the analysis that follows, we include controls for these characteristics.
RESULTS

Result 1. Understanding is high and uncorrelated with session-level treatment. Understanding in the SELFa2 session is no lower than in the SELFa and SELFn sessions.
We tested understanding with five questions. For these we have complete responses for 444 out of 447 subjects. The first three questions dealt with understanding of the network graph. Very few people got these questions wrong. The further two questions tested understanding of the relevant incentives.30 There was somewhat more variation here, and we hence create a binary variable for whether the participant got both of these questions right. Reassuringly, about 80 percent of participants answered both questions correctly.
Appendix Table B .4 shows the result of a linear probability model where the understanding variable is regressed over a number of session treatment dummies. 31 The first column includes dummies for four treatments: SELFa is the residual category. There are no significant differences in understanding across treatments. The second column shows that in the SELFa2 treatment, where no explanation was given of the relevant incentives, understanding was not significantly different. Of participants in the SELFa2 treatment, 77 percent got both questions right.
If participants did not want to make a linking decision, they had the option of writing "R," in which case a link would be picked at random for them.
32 A high percentage of random decisions could be interpreted as a signal of poor understanding. The data dispel such concerns. The random link option was used in only 12 percent of decisions, and only 8 percent of participants chose a random link twice. Furthermore, the likelihood of choosing a random link was not statistically different across treatment.
Taken together, these results reassure us that the experiment was well understood. We can hence proceed to analyze the linking decisions of participants.
Result 2. Subjects in SELFa and SELFn treatments are more likely to establish links with peripheral individuals than with more central peers. Table 5 .1 shows results from estimation of the dyadic regression model 7. Facing a degree 2 or degree 3 player significantly decreases the probability of referral, compared to the residual category of degree 1 players. These results are a broad confirmation of hypothesis 1. Participants understand the incentives arising from competition for referrals, and their linking decisions are consistent with a concern with maximizing the chance of referral. A simple descriptive analysis of the postplay questionnaire is consistent with our interpretation of the results: 75 percent of players in SELF treatments answered that they played to maximize the chance of getting a referral. Appendix Figure B .6 shows these data graphically. However, not all participants choose to link with peripheral agents in the SELF treatments. This may be consistent with heterogeneity of motives and understanding or with mistakes. 30 In the SELF treatments, this was the probability of receiving a referral from agents with different degree centrality. Participants were asked whether they would be more likely to receive a referral from a degree X or a degree Y agent. In the OTHER treatments we focused on the probability that an agent with a given level of degree centrality would get a referral for him-or herself. We asked participants whether an agent of degree X was more likely to get a referral than an agent of degree Y.
31 Standard errors are clustered at the session level, as in all other regressions in this paper. 32 Participants could write "R" in place of either of the links. A blank box counted as an "R". In column 3 we test whether play differs when anonymity is relaxed or incentives are not explained. The latter has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of linking to a peripheral individual. This is evidence against priming and is consistent with responses to the postplay questionnaire: Individuals in SELFa2 were even more likely to report that they played to maximize their chance of referral than their counterparts in SELFa. Relaxing anonymity increases somewhat the number of degree 3 individuals who are chosen. This is possibly due to additional motives for linking in nonanonymous treatments: About 7.5 percent of players in SELFn claim that they have chosen their real friends.
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Result 3. The likelihood of linking with a peripheral agent in SELF treatments is significantly higher for players with high understanding of the game. It is not correlated with giving in the dictator game.
Result 3 focuses on heterogeneity of play. Table 5 .2 below we shows that the main effect is unchanged when restricting attention to high-understanding players (column 1). We further show that highunderstanding players are more likely to choose degree 1 partners than low-understanding players (column 2) and that giving in the dictator game does not change the play of the game (column 3). Let us now turn to subjects in OTHER treatments. We first look at the amount sent in the dictator game. Figure 5 .1 summarizes the data: Giving is substantial. The mean amount sent is ETB 6, which is just about one-quarter of the endowment and is in line with the experimental evidence across the world (Camerer 2003) . We interpret this result as evidence of substantial other-regarding motives in the population. Furthermore, we note that the modal amount sent is half of the endowment, which potentially reflects a norm of equality.
Figure5.1-Results from dictator game
Source: Authors' elaboration. We now estimate model 7 with data from the OTHERa and OTHERn conditions and report the results in Table 5 .3. The coefficients on the dummies for j's degree are small and insignificant. Subjects in nonanonymous treatments seem less likely to link with peripheral peers than subjects in anonymous treatments, but this difference is not significant. If we restrict the sample to subjects in the OTHERa treatment, the effect has the hypothesized direction but is statistically imprecise. In short, we are unable to find evidence for hypothesis 2. Individuals do not seem to link with peripheral peers more often than if they were choosing with a random rule. In Table 5 .4 we test whether we can find limited support for hypothesis 2 for individuals who understood the game well. This turns out not to be the case. We also cannot find evidence that giving in the dictator game is correlated with the decision to link with a peripheral peer. This falsifies hypothesis 3. Responses from the question about players' motivation are helpful to explain the above results. In OTHERa, where reasons related to the network position should be more prominent, about 29 percent of individuals declared that they "chose at random" to give every peer an equal chance, whereas only 12 percent of individuals claimed to have "chosen the peer who needed help the most." 34 In other words, reducing inequality in links endowments was not perceived as the fair thing to do. This result is striking given that in allocation tasks subjects in our sample and in other studies across Africa south of the Sahara seem to be transferring resources to reduce or cancel initial inequalities (Miller Moya et al. 2011; Mueller 2012) .
Finally, we analyze separately the data from the non-anonymous treatments. Here we can use a full set of dyadic covariates. Our hypothesis is that knowing individual j will motivate individuals in the OTHERn treatment, but not in SELFn. Estimates are reported in Table 5 .5. We find evidence for the first part of our hypothesis but not for the second. Subjects in OTHERn are indeed more likely to link with individuals they know. This seems to be the only significant predictor of linking behavior in the OTHERn treatment. Second, the result for SELFn is opposite to what was hypothesized. Linking decisions are still significantly driven by material concerns, as showed by the significant and large coefficients on the dummy variables for the degree of player j. However, individuals are also more likely to link with their actual peers. This is surprising as in this game choosing somebody you know brings no benefit to yourself or to your peers. This result is instead consistent with a model in which decision makers exhibit concerns for social identity and have a preference to reestablish such identity by linking to in-group members. Result 7. In non-anonymous treatments, subjects are more likely to link with known peers.
We also test whether in OTHERn individuals are more likely to link with known peers who earn less, do not have jobs, or have fewer connections in the neighborhood. These effects would be consistent with the model of other-regarding preferences outlined above and would indicate that individuals are responding to field characteristics and not to the characteristics imposed in the lab. We are unable to find any evidence of these effects.
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In the postplay questionnaire, only about 3 percent of players in SELFn and OTHERn answered that they chose people they knew in real life. However, participants may have felt embarrassed to admit making such discriminations. Furthermore, statistical power may be a problem in these regressions: i knows j in only about 8.5 percent of dyads in SELFn and 7 percent in OTHERn.
CONCLUSIONS
In poor, growing economies like Ethiopia structural change and the increased availability of well-paying jobs hold a promise to deliver substantial poverty reduction in the coming years. However, individuals and groups that perform poorly in the search process are less likely to benefit from these new opportunities (African Development Bank 2012; World Bank 2013). Job contact networks play a crucial role with this in many developed and developing countries, including Ethiopia. Using unique dyadic data on social interactions in the labor market of a mid-size Ethiopian town, we reveal a skewed distribution of links in neighborhood-level job market networks. Many individuals do not take part in the exchange of valuable information and referrals. This is inconsistent with extant models of strategic network formation, which posit that competition for scarce referrals motivates self-interested individuals to link with so far poorly connected peers. It is also inconsistent with models of other-regarding preferences, such as social efficiency maximization or inequity aversion. However, with observational data alone it is hard to establish whether these predictions fail because the models misrepresent individuals' decision making processes or because they do not capture the relevant incentives in the field. In this paper we devise a labin-the-field experiment that tests whether individuals link with peripheral peers when it is in their material interest to do so and when other-regarding considerations are made salient.
In treatments where agents form additional links to receive referrals and where competition for referrals is salient, we find broad support for strategic network formation. Agents are more likely to form new ties with currently peripheral agents, and such effect is robust to the relaxation of the anonymity condition. Furthermore, subjects understand the incentives deriving from competition for referrals even when these are not explicitly explained and do not seem to be primed by our explanations into behaving strategically. In treatments wherein other-regarding considerations are made salient, we are unable to find evidence of a significant desire to include peripheral individuals. This is despite most people's giving substantial amounts in an initial dictator game, which is suggestive of widespread other-regarding preferences in the population. Evidence from a postexperiment questionnaire tentatively explains this finding as the result of a norm of equality that is applied despite unequal endowments of network links. Finally, in all non-anonymous treatments, agents have a tendency to link with peers whom they known in real life, even when this brings no additional material benefit to either party.
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the theory of strategic network formation put forward in Calvo-Armengol (2004) . This is suggestive of a potential, context-dependent mechanism of inclusion. However, the lack of an unconditional social preference to support peripheral individuals suggests that when local incentives do not favor the latter, unequal access to job contact networks will persist. Observational data from the city of Kombolcha indeed shows that integration in job contact networks varies widely between individuals. To revert this situation, policy can target the field incentives to which network formation responds. For example, employers could be subsidized to rely more often on referees from disadvantaged groups. Albeit such policy may sometimes result in adverse selection (Beaman and Magruder 2012; Beaman, Keleher, and Magruder 2013) , it would have beneficial effects on two levels. First, due to homophily, it would increase the number of individuals from peripheral groups referred into jobs. Second, as suggested by the results of this paper, it would incentivize workers to include poorly connected individuals in their job networks, breaking the cycle of exclusion. 
FigureB.6-Self-reported motives for linking decisions in OTHER
Source: Authors' elaboration. 
